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Cause No.: ADV-2021-124

MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY

ORDER ON PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS and RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

THE HELENA INDEPENDENT RECORD, THE MISSOULIAN, THE MONTANA STANDARD, MONTANA FREE PRESS, THE RAVALLI REPUBLIC, LEE ENTERPRISES, HAGADONE MEDIA

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE

BOZEMAN DAILY CHRONICLE,

BILLINGS GAZETTE, THE

ENTERPRISES, HAGADONE MEDIA MONTANA, THE MONTANA BROADCASTER'S ASSOCIATION, and THE MONTANA NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,

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BARRY USHER in his capacity as Chair of the Montana House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,

Respondent.

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Before the Court are two motions. Petitioners Associated Press, Billings Gazette, Montana Standard, Helena Independent Record, Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Missoulian, Montana Standard, Montana Free Press, Ravalli Republic, Lee Enterprises, Hagadone Media Montana, Montana Broadcaster's Association, and Montana Newspaper Association filed a motion judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Barry Usher (Usher), in his capacity as Chair of the Montana House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, filed a motion to dismiss.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioners are wire news and digital services, daily Montana newspapers, publishers and owners of Montana newspapers, and membership organizations of radio, television and news media. Usher is the Chair of the Judiciary Committee of the Montana House of Representatives. On January 12, 2021, Usher presided over a meeting of the House Judiciary committee in which the matter of executive action would occur on several bills, some of which pertained to transgender health and abortion. Upon convening the meeting with a quorum present, before the members voted on the legislation, Usher called for a recess. The apparent reason for doing so was to allow Usher to discuss the proposed legislation in private with other members of the Republican majority on the committee. During the recess, Usher and some Republican members of the committee convened in a room in the basement of the Capitol building. Mara Silvers, a reporter for the Montana Free Press, sought to enter the room to observe and report on the matters discussed. Usher told Silvers the meeting was closed. He further explained that three Republican members of the House Judiciary committee were excluded from the meeting. Of the 19 members of the committee, only 8 or 9 were present in the basement. Because those remaining

did not constitute a quorum of the full committee, Usher told Silvers the meeting could proceed in private.

After the meeting, Usher reconvened the House Judiciary committee and proceeded to take executive action by voting on the bills. Petitioners subsequently brought this action, asking the Court to declare Usher's closure of the meeting in violation of Montana's constitutional right to know, as guaranteed under Article II, Section 9 and Article V, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution. Petitioners filed a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings. Usher filed a motion to dismiss.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW

"No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure."

Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution.

To conform with Article II, Section 9, Montana's open meeting law provides,

"[a]ll meetings of public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies of the state, or any political subdivision of the state or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending public funds, including the supreme court, must be open to the public."

Montana Code Annotated § 2-3-203(1).

"As defined by statute, a "meeting" is a "convening of a quorum of the constituent membership of" the public or governmental body or board, "whether corporal or by means of electronic equipment, to hear, discuss, or act upon a matter over which the [body or board] has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power." Section 2-3-202, MCA.

Raap v. Bd. of Trs., 2018 MT 58, ¶ 8, 391 Mont. 12, 414 P.3d 788.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts must consider the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the allegations in the complaint as true.

Goodman Realty, Inc. v. Monson, 267 Mont. 228, 231, 883 P.2d 121, 123 (1994). A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief. McKinnon v. W. Sugar Coop. Corp., 2010 MT 24, ¶ 12, 355 Mont. 120, 225 P.3d 1221. In other words, dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate the plaintiff does not have a claim. Buttrell v. McBride Land & Livestock Co., 170 Mont. 296, 298, 553 P.2d 407, 408 (1976). For these reasons, a trial court rarely grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. If a complaint lacks specificity, further discovery may be the appropriate remedy, rather than dismissal. McKinnon, ¶ 24.

An asserted claim is subject to dismissal if, as pled, it is insufficient to state a cognizable claim entitling the claimant to relief. Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take all well-pled factual assertions as true and view them in the light most favorable to the claimant, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the claim. *Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A.*, 2017 MT 313, ¶ 8, 390 Mont. 12, 407 P.3d 692.

ANALYSIS

Usher asks the Court to dismiss the petition because it is undisputed that fewer than a quorum of representatives attended the gathering in the Capitol basement. Accordingly, he argues, their discussion of the proposed legislation did not constitute a "meeting" pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 2-3-202,

and thus does not invoke Montana's guarantee of open meetings and right to know. The Court agrees. The gathering of a minority of committee members during a recess does not constitute a public meeting that would require the Court to invoke the balancing test pursuant to Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution.

Petitioners argue the subgroup of legislators who met to discuss proposed legislation constitutes a quorum—as it was comprised of a majority of the members of the majority party on the committee. The Court is unwilling to redefine "quorum" as "a majority of a majority." In this case, the eight or nine legislators who gathered in the Capitol basement did not constitute a quorum of the committee, hence no "meeting" occurred.

Petitioners cite to *Associated Press v. Crofts*, 2004 MT 120, ¶31, 321 Mont. 193, 89 P.3d 971, for the proposition that "[d]evices such as not fixing a specific membership of a body, not adopting formal rules, not keeping minutes in violation of § 2-3-212, MCA, and not requiring formal votes, must not be allowed to defeat the constitutional and statutory provisions which require that the public's business be openly conducted." Petitioners argue that intentionally limiting the attendees of the recess-gathering to less than a quorum qualifies as a "device" to defeat constitutional and statutory provisions as in *Crofts*. The Court disagrees. *Crofts* is readily distinguished from the case at hand. In *Crofts*, the public body at issue was a "policy committee" assembled by the Montana Commissioner of Higher Education (Crofts) consisting of a group of upper-level employees of the university system. *Crofts*, ¶ 6. In distinguishing the policy committee from "merely a fact finding body" or "an *ad hoc* group which came together to consider a specific matter", the Supreme Court found:

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The Policy Committee came together at times that were noticed, and agendas were prepared. Moreover [...] the agendas make it clear that the matters deliberated were somehow memorialized, as such matters were remembered, and re-discussed at successive meetings. The Policy Committee's meetings required substantial time, inconvenience and travel by the attendees, all of whom were expected to attend. Further, the various costs of conducting the meetings were paid with public funds.

Crofts, ¶¶ 23-24.

In the present matter, Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee who gathered during a committee recess more closely resembles an ad hoc group than the organized deliberative body at issue in Crofts. In this distinct circumstance, the precedent established in *Crofts* does not apply. The facts here are further distinguished in that the policy committee, unlike a legislative committee, had no quorum requirement. Accordingly, the Montana Supreme Court took the opportunity to adopt the common law rule that in a deliberative body with no quorum requirement, a quorum is deemed to be all members in attendance. Crofts, ¶ 31. By contrast, the House Judiciary committee has very clear quorum requirements. There is no dispute the Representatives who gathered during the recess did not constitute a quorum. For these reasons, Croft is not applicable.

Both parties cite Willems v. State, 2014 MT 82, ¶ 25, 374 Mont. 343, 325 P.3d 1204, in support of their positions. In Willems, the Montana Supreme Court considered whether "serial one-on-one discussions" between members of the State redistricting committee constituted a "meeting" under Montana Code Annotated § 2-3-202. The Montana Supreme Court concluded no /////

1	meeting occurred and declined to adopt a so-called "constructive quorum" rule.
2	Willems, ¶ 25.
3	Though the Willems Court declined to adopt the constructive
4	quorum rule "under the facts presented" therein, (Willems, ¶ 25) petitioners argue
5	the Montana Supreme Court is likely to do so under the facts in this case. This
6	Court, however, will not apply the law in anticipation of the Montana Supreme
7	Court recognizing a standard it has previously declined to adopt.
8	Accordingly,
9	ORDER
10	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Petitioner's motion for judgment on
11	the pleadings is DENIED .
12	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Usher's motion to dismiss is
13	GRANTED.
14	DATED this g^{M} day of July 2021.
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16	_ MrL Minche_
17	MIKE MENAHAN
18	District Court Judge
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20	cc: Peter M. Meloy, via email at: mike@meloylawfirm.com
21	Austin Knudsen, via email at: Austin.Knudsen@mt.gov
22	Derek Oestreicher, via email at: Derek.Oestreicher@mt.gov Aislinn Brown, via email at: Aislinn.Brown@mt.gov
23	,
24	MM/sm/ADV-2021-124 Order – Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
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