

Case Number: DA 21-0605

ANGLE SPARKS, Clerk of District Court
By TREIJGERS Deputy Clerk

# MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY

BOARD OF REGENTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF THE STATE OF MONTANA,

Petitioner,

V.

THE STATE OF MONTANA, by and through Austin Knudsen, Attorney General of the State of Montana in his official capacity,

Respondent.

Cause No.: BDV-2021-598

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

Pending before the Court are the Montana Higher Education Board of Regents (BOR) and the State of Montana's (Montana) respective summary judgment motions relative to BOR's May 27, 2021 Judicial Review Petition seeking, among other things, an order from this Court declaring "HB 102 ... unconstitutional as applied to BOR, MUS and MUS campuses and locations."

David Diacon and Daniels County timely submitted their respective *amicus* briefs. The motions are fully briefed.

On November 30, 2021, at Montana's request, oral argument was held. It was represented by David Dewhirst and Kathleen L. Smithgall. BOR was represented by Martha Sheehy and Ali Bovingdon.

For the reasons stated below, BOR's summary judgment motion is **GRANTED**, and Montana's summary judgment motion is **DENIED**.

## **REVIEW STANDARDS**

## **Summary Judgment**

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mont. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Since the controlling issue before this Court is strictly a legal question, summary judgment is appropriate at this juncture as a matter of law. See *Lingscheit v. Cascade County*, 249 Mont. 526, 531, 817 P.2d 682 (1991).

#### **Constitutional Issue**

"Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and it is the duty of this Court to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation if possible." Hernandez, ¶ 15 (citing Montanans for the Responsible Use of the School Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 1999 MT 263, ¶ 11, 296 Mont. 402, 989 P.2d 800; State v. Nye, 283 Mont. 505, 510, 943 P.2d 96, 99 (1997)). The party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the heavy burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt." Molnar v. Fox, 2013 MT 132, ¶ 49, 370 Mont. 238, 301 P.3d 824.

When interpreting constitutional provisions, we apply the same rules as those used in construing statutes. *Nelson v. City of Billings*, 2018 MT 36, ¶ 14, 390 Mont. 290, 412 P.3d 1058. But just as with statutory interpretation, constitutional construction should not "lead to absurd results, if reasonable construction will avoid it." *Nelson*, ¶

16 (citing Grossman v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Res., 209 Mont. 427, 451, 682 P.2d 1319, 1332 (1984)). "The principle of reasonable construction 'allows courts to fulfill their adjudicatory mandate and preserve the [Framers'] objective." Nelson, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). Thus:

Even in the context of clear and unambiguous language . . . we have long held that we must determine constitutional intent not only from the plain meaning of the language used, but also in light of the historical and surrounding circumstances under which the Framers drafted the Constitution, the nature of the subject matter they faced, and the objective they sought to achieve.

Brown v. Gianforte, 2021 MT 149, ¶¶ 32-33, 404 Mont. 269, 488 P.3d. 548 (citing authority). Moreover, statutes conflicting with the Montana Constitution are subordinate to the constitution but, if possible, must be interpreted to harmonize with it. See Pengra v. State, 2000 MT 291, ¶ 14, 302 Mont. 276, 14 P.3d 499. In addition, a statute's constitutionality "is prima facie presumed, and every intendment in its favor will be made unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt." Judge, 168 Mont. at 444 (citing authority). Notwithstanding, however, statutory application that is contrary to a "constitutional directive" is unconstitutional "under any level of scrutiny." City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., 2018 MT 139, ¶ 31, 419 P.3d 685. Whether a statute is constitutional is a legal question. Id.

### UNDISPUTED BACKGROUND

"The Board of Regents and its members, as well as the entire MUS, is an independent board within the executive branch." *Sheehy v. Commissioner of Political Practices*, 2020 MT 37, ¶ 11, 399 Mont. 26, 458 P.3d 309 (fn. 1).

Montana's 1889 Constitution provided, in relevant part, that:

The general control and supervision of the state university and the various other state educational institutions shall be vested in a state board of education, whose powers and duties shall be prescribed and regulated by law.

Mont. Const. (1889), art. XI, § 11 (emphasis added). "This provision of the Constitution contemplates and authorizes the legislature to prescribe powers and duties of the state board of education." *Means v. State Bd. of Educ.*, 127 Mont., 515, 518, 267 P.2d 981 (1954); see also, *Board of Regents v. Judge*, 168 Mont. 433, 442, 543 P.2d 1323, 1325 (1975) (Mont. Const. (1889) art. XI, § 11 gave BOR general control and supervision but limited its powers to those which 'shall be prescribed and regulated by law." (emphasis added).

Under the 1889 Constitution, BOR's was statutorily required, among other things, to:

- (1) have general control and supervision of the units of the Montana university system, which shall be considered for all purposes one university;
- (2) adopt rules, not inconsistent with the constitution and the laws of the state for its own government which are proper and necessary for the execution of the powers and duties conferred upon it by law;
- (3) provide, subject to the laws of the state, rules for the government of the system;

Rev. Code Mont. 1947, 75-8501 (1947); codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-301 (1971).

Under the 1889 Constitution, BOR was statutorily authorized to "exercise full control and complete management" of MUS:

/////

/ \		
(a)	land	•
	land	
(/		7

- (b) residence halls, dormitories, houses, apartments, and other housing facilities;
- (c) dining rooms and halls, restaurants, cafeterias, and other food service facilities;
  - (d) student union buildings and facilities; and
- (e) those other facilities specifically authorized by joint resolution of the legislature

Rev. Code Mont.1947, 75-8503 (1947); codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-302 (1971).

Under the 1889 Constitution, the Legislature authorized that:

Security guards shall be authorized to carry firearms between sunset and sunrise and at any time when acting as guards for transportation of money or other valuables.

Rev. Code Mont.1947, 75-8516 (1947); codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 (1971).

In 1972, BOR's constitutional power and authority substantially increased:

The government and control of the Montana university system is vested in a board of regents of higher education which shall have full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system and shall supervise and coordinate other public educational institutions assigned by law.

Mont. Const., art. X, §9(2)(a) (emphasis added). "[U]nder the 1972 Montana Constitution, [BOR] was given 'full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system." *Judge*, at 442.

/////

In 1981, Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 was amended to read:

Security guards who have successfully completed the basic course in law enforcement conducted by the Montana law enforcement academy may carry firearms in accordance with policies established by the [BOR]:

- (1) between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m.; and
- (2) whenever guarding money or other valuables.

Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 (1981).

In 1991, Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 was amended to read:

Security guards who have successfully completed the basic course in law enforcement conducted by the Montana law enforcement academy may carry firearms in accordance with policies established by the board of regents after consulting with the student body government at the unit of the university system affected by the regents' policy.

Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 (1991).1

BOR Policy 1006 closely mirrors Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 in that the only individuals authorized to carry firearms on MUS properties are:

- 1. those persons who are acting in the capacity of police or security department officers and who:
- a. have successfully completed the basic course in law enforcement conducted by the Montana Law Enforcement Academy or an equivalent course conducted by another state agency and recognized as such by the Crime Control Division of the Montana Department of Justice; or
  - b. have passed the state approved equivalency examination by the Montana Law Enforcement Academy; and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See also Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 (2021). The 2021 Legislature did not amend, alter or repeal Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324.

2. those persons who are employees of a contracted private security company and who are registered to carry firearms pursuant to Title 37, Chapter 60, MCA.

BOR Policy 1006 (11/18/99 and revised 5/25/12).

Today, Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-301<sup>2</sup> provides, in relevant part, that:

The board of regents of higher education shall serve as regents of the Montana university system, shall use and adopt this style in all its dealings with the university system, and:

- (1) must have general control and supervision of the units of the Montana university system, which is considered for all purposes one university;
- (2) shall adopt rules for its own government that are consistent with the constitution and the laws of the state and that are proper and necessary for the execution of the powers and duties conferred upon it by law;
- (3) shall provide, subject to the laws of the state, rules for the government of the system;
- (6) must have, when not otherwise provided by law, control of all books, records, buildings, grounds, and other property of the system;

Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-301 (2021).

Today, the BOR may "exercise full control and complete management of [revenue producing] facilities." Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-302 (4) (2021)<sup>3</sup>.

On February 18, Governor Gianforte signed HB102<sup>4</sup>. Most of HB 102's sections became immediately effective although section 6 which is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The 2021 Legislature did not amend, alter or repeal Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-301.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The 2021 Legislature did not alter, amend or repeal Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-302.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-353 through 45-8-359, and Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-311.

applicable to the BOR was to become effective on June 1, 2021<sup>5</sup>. HB 102 provides, in relevant part, that:

**Section 1. Purpose.** The purpose of [sections 1 through 11] is to enhance the safety of people by expanding their legal ability to provide for their own defense by reducing or eliminating government-mandated places where only criminals are armed and where citizens are prevented from exercising their fundamental right to defend themselves and others.

Section 2. Legislative intent. It is the intent of the legislature to reduce or remove provisions of law that limit or prohibit the ability of citizens to defend themselves by restricting with prior restraint the right to keep or bear arms that the people have reserved to themselves in the Montana constitution, and to further establish that the right to defense of a person's life, liberty, or property is a fundamental right.

**Section 3. Legislative findings.** The legislature declares and finds as follows:

- (1) Nowhere in Article X, section 9(2)(a), of the Montana constitution is any power granted to amend, suspend, alter, or abolish the Montana constitution, nor is any power granted to affect or interfere with the rights the people have reserved to themselves specifically from interference by government entities and government actors in Article II of the Montana constitution.
- (2) The Montana university system was created and is controlled by the Montana constitution and the land and buildings occupied by the university system are public property and not private property and are therefore clearly government entities.
- (3) Any significant prohibition upon the possession of firearms at or on the various campuses of the Montana university system

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> On May 28, 2021, this Court temporarily stayed and enjoined sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. On June 7, 2021, this Court converted the temporary injunction to a preliminary injunction.

calls into question the rights that the people have reserved to protect themselves from government interference under Article II, section 12, of the Montana constitution.

- (4) Zones where guns are prohibited provide an increased risk to the health and safety of citizens because these zones create an unreasonable expectation of government-provided safety, while that safety cannot be provided or ensured.
- (5) In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the United States supreme court affirmed that the second amendment to the United States constitution reserves to individuals the fundamental right to keep and bear arms for self-defense and is applicable as a restriction upon state and local governments and all political subdivisions of state and local government through the 14th amendment to the United States constitution.

Section 4. Where concealed weapon may be carried -- exceptions. A person with a current and valid permit issued pursuant to 45-8-321 or recognized pursuant to 45-8-329 may not be prohibited or restricted from exercising that permit anywhere in the state, except:

- (1) in a correctional, detention, or treatment facility operated by or contracted with the department of corrections or a secure treatment facility operated by the department of public health and human services;
- (2) in a detention facility or secure area of a law enforcement facility owned and operated by a city or county;
- (3) at or beyond a security screening checkpoint regulated by the transportation security administration in a publicly owned, commercial airport;
- (4) in a building owned and occupied by the United States;
- (5) on a military reservation owned and managed by the United States;

- (6) on private property where the owner of the property or the person who possesses or is in control of the property, including a tenant or lessee of the property, expressly prohibits firearms;
- (7) within a courtroom or an area of a courthouse in use by court personnel pursuant to an order of a justice of the peace or judge; or
- (8) in a school building as determined by a school board pursuant to 45-8-361.

Section 5. Prohibition on infringement of constitutional rights. The board of regents and all university system employees subject to the authority of the board of regents are prohibited from enforcing or coercing compliance with any rule or regulation that diminishes or restricts the rights of the people to keep or bear arms as reserved to them in Article II of the Montana constitution, especially those rights reserved in Article II, sections 4 through 12, notwithstanding any authority of the board of regents under Article X, section 9(2)(a), of the Montana constitution.

# Section 6. Regulation of firearms prohibited for certain people -- exceptions.

- (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), the board of regents and any unit of the university system may not regulate, restrict, or place an undue burden on the possession, transportation, or storage of firearms on or within university system property by a person eligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law and meeting the minimum safety and training requirements in 45-8-321(3).
- (2) The board of regents or a unit of the university system may prohibit or regulate the following:
  - (a) the discharge of a firearm on or within university system property unless the discharge is done in self-defense;

- (b) the removal of a firearm from a gun case or holster unless the removal is done in self-defense or within the domicile on campus of the lawful possessor of the firearm;
- (c) the pointing of a firearm at another person unless the lawful possessor is acting in self-defense;
- (d) the carrying of a firearm outside of a domicile on campus unless the firearm is within a case or holster;
- (e) the failure to secure a firearm with a locking device whenever the firearm is not in the possession of or under the immediate control of the lawful possessor of the firearm;
- (f) the possession or storage of a firearm in an on-campus dormitory or housing unit without the express permission of any roommate of the lawful possessor of the firearm;
- (g) the possession or storage of a firearm by any individual who has a history of adjudicated university system discipline arising out of the individual's interpersonal violence or substance abuse;
- (h) the possession of a firearm at an event on campus where campus authorities have authorized alcohol to be served and consumed; and
- (i) the possession of a firearm at an athletic or entertainment event open to the public with controlled access and armed security on site.
- **Section 7. Remedy for violations.** Any person that suffers deprivation of rights enumerated under [sections 1 through 6] has a cause of action against any governmental entity, as defined in 2-9-101. The cause of action must be filed in district court. If a person asserting a deprivation of rights prevails, the person may be awarded reasonable costs, attorney fees, and damages.

## Section 8. Section 45-3-111, MCA, is amended to read:

"45-3-111. Openly carrying weapon -- display -- exemption. (1) Any person who is not otherwise prohibited from doing so by federal or state law may openly carry a weapon and may communicate to another person the fact that the person has a weapon.

- (2) If a person reasonably believes that the person or another person is threatened with bodily harm, the person may warn or threaten the use of force, including deadly force, against the aggressor, including drawing or presenting a weapon.
- (3) This section does not limit the authority of the board of regents or other postsecondary institutions to regulate the carrying of weapons, as defined in 45-8-361(5)(b), on their campuses."

HB 102, §§ 1-8.

### **DISCUSSION**

The sole issue in this proceeding is whether the Legislature or the Executive branch, via the BOR, has the exclusive constitutional authority to regulate firearms on MUS campuses and other locations. BOR and Montana's respective positions center on their interpretations of Article X, Section 9, 1972 Montana Constitution. BOR has the burden to establish HB 102 is unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt." *Judge*, 168 Mont. at 444 (citing authority). Moreover, as Justice McKinnon recognized, a court "must engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the legislature's action impermissibly infringes on [BOR's] Board's authority." *Sheehy v. Commissioner of Political Practices*, 2020 MT 37, ¶ 38, 399 Mont. 26, 458 P.3d 309 (J. McKinnon, specially concurring)) (citing *Judge*, 168 Mont. at 451).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Amici Daniels' County 'prior restraint" argument is not applicable in this proceeding. Such a challenge relative to BOR Policy 1006 is for another day, if at all. In this regard, this Court agrees with BOR that "[n]either the propriety of Policy 1006 nor its constitutionality is at issue here."

## **BOR's Constitutional Authority to Regulate Firearms on MUS Property**

"It has . . . frequently been stated that the Montana Constitution, unlike the Constitution of our United States, <u>is a prohibition upon legislative power</u>, rather than a grant of power." *Judge*, 168 Mont. at 444 (citing authority) (emphasis added). The *Judge* Court noted that "the legislature is not mentioned in Article X, Section 9(2), which entrusts the government and control of the university system to the [BOR]." *Id.*, at 451. It also noted that "[i]nherent in the constitutional provision granting the [BOR its] power is the realization that the [BOR] is the competent body for determining priorities in higher education." *Id.*, at 454.

The Duck Inn Court established that the BOR has:

authority over the Montana university system which is independent of that delegated by the legislature. Article X, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution expressly creates the [BOR] as a constitutional entity and vests the government and control of the Montana university system therein. Indeed, the [BOR] is given "full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system . . . ." Art. X, Sec. 9, Mont. Const.

The Duck Inn v. Montana State University-Northern, 285 Mont. 519, 526, 949 P.2d 1179 (1997).

The *Sheehy* Court reiterated that BOR has sole authority to "supervise, coordinate, manage and control [MUS]." Mont. Const., art. X, §9(2)(a). In this regard, [BOR] has broad constitutional and statutory authority to determine the best policies to "ensure the health and stability of the MUS." *Sheehy*, at ¶ 29.

/////

Montana argues that BOR has no authority to regulate firearms on MUS' property or other locations. It contends that *Judge*, *Duck Inn*, and *Sheehy*:

clearly explain that "[t]he Board may exercise all powers connected with the proper and efficient internal governance of the MUS," but that "there are limitations and checks on the Board's power" including constitutional rights and "state legislation enforcing statewide standards for public welfare, health, and safety." *Sheehy*, ¶ 41 (McKinnon, J., concurring).

(Brief, p. 11).

Here, though, the Board is not trying to exercise a power related to the financial, academic, or administrative stability of the MUS. It is trying to commandeer the Legislature's prerogative to enforce "statewide standards for public welfare, health, and safety" on MUS campuses. *Id.* But it cannot be the rule that the Legislature's police power extends everywhere throughout the State but falters at the campus threshold. The Board is not, after all, a separate branch of government in Montana. See *Sheehy*, ¶ 11 n.1; *Judge*, 168 Mont. at 449–451, 543 P.2d at 1332–33. The bottom line is that the Legislature is the Legislature, even on MUS campuses. And in many instances, the Board's policy preferences must yield to the policy of the State—which the Legislature determines and articulates. Such is the case with HB 102.

The Legislature has the power to regulate firearms within the confines of the state and federal constitutions. And the Legislature has the power to regulate certain on-campus activity. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. §§ 19-20-621; 20-25-515; 20-25-511; 20-25-513; 20-25-451; 20-25-603. The Board may have the power to regulate—and indeed has regulated—firearms, self-defense, and student safety matters on campus. But that does not preempt the Legislature from regulating those same issues on campus. The opposite it true; HB 102 has displaced Policy 1006.

*Id.*, pp. 11-12.

Like in Colorado, the Montana Legislature has the authority to regulate firearms on campus. Although the Board possesses broad power to supervise and control MUS campuses, this doesn't mean that the Legislature can never act with respect to campus activity and property. HB 102 regulates important health, welfare, and safety concerns within the police power of the State as exercised by the Legislature. Duck Inn, 285 Mont. at 523, 949 P.2d at 1181; Judge, 168 Mont. at 449, 543 P.2d at 1332.

*Id.*, p. 13.

Montana's reliance on Colorado, Texas, Utah and Georgia concealed campus carry laws is not persuasive. Neither Texas nor Utah has similar constitutionally created, delegated and empowered higher education boards so their campus conceal carry laws are not applicable. As to Colorado, its constitutionally created Board of Regents' power is subject to implicit legislative oversight ("unless otherwise provided by law"). Moreover, in regard to Georgia, its constitutionally created board apparently ceded<sup>7</sup> its authority to the legislature which paved the way for Georgia's concealed campus carry law. OCGA § 16-11-127.1(c)(20)(A)–(C) (2017).

As this Court understands, there are only nine such constitutionally created bodies that have been expressly delegated substantial governance powers. See Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9(a) ("The University of California shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing corporation known as 'The Regents of the University of California,' with *full powers of organization and government*, subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security of its funds and compliance with the terms of the endowments of the university and such competitive bidding procedures as may be made applicable to the university by statute for the letting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Montana neither contradicts nor disputes BOR's argument in this regard.

of construction contracts, sales of real property, and purchasing of materials, goods, and services.") (emphasis added); Colo. Const., art. VIII, § 5 (2) ("The governing boards of the state institutions of higher education, whether established by this constitution or by law, shall have the general supervision of their respective institutions and the exclusive control and direction of all funds of and appropriations to their respective institutions, unless otherwise provided by law.") (emphasis added); Ga. Const., art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1(b) ("The government, control, and management of the University System of Georgia and all of the institutions in said system shall be vested in the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia."); Idaho Const., art IX, § 10 ("The regents shall have the general supervision of the university, and the control and direction of all the funds of, and appropriations to, the university, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. The regents may impose rates of tuition and fees on all students enrolled in the university as authorized by law.") (emphasis added); MCLS Const., art. VIII, § 5 ("Each board shall have general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds.") (emphasis added); Minn. Const., art. XIII, § 3 ("All the rights, immunities, franchises and endowments heretofore granted or conferred upon the University of Minnesota are perpetuated unto the university."); Mont. Const., art. X, § 9, §9(2)(a) ("The government and control of the Montana university system is vested in a board of regents of higher education which shall have full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system and shall supervise and coordinate other public educational institutions assigned by law.") (emphasis added); Ne. Const., art. VII, § 10 (The general government of the University of Nebraska shall, under the

direction of the Legislature, be vested in a board of not less than six nor more than eight regents to be designated the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, who shall be elected from and by districts as herein provided and three students of the University of Nebraska who shall serve as nonvoting members ... Their duties and powers shall be prescribed by law; and they shall receive no compensation, but may be reimbursed their actual expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties.") (emphasis added); and Okla. Const., art. XIII, § 8 ("The government of the University of Oklahoma shall be vested in a Board of Regents consisting of seven members to be appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.")

Furthermore, Montana's arguments relative to BOR's constitutional authority ignores that the Legislature's former implicit authority over the BOR under Montana's 1889 constitution (art. XI, § 11 "shall be prescribed and regulated by law") was eradicated in the 1972 constitution.

under the 1972 Montana Constitution, the Board's status was transformed from one of legislative devise to a constitutional department with the authority to "supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system." See Mont. Const. art. X, § 9(2)(a). This Court has previously confirmed the Board's need for reasonable constitutional autonomy, free from excessive legislative control, in *Duck Inn v. Mont. State Univ.-N.*, 285 Mont 519, 526, 949 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1997), and *Bd. of Regents v. Judge*, 168 Mont. 433, 449, 543 P.2d 1323, 1332 (1975).

Sheehy, ¶35 (J. McKinnon, specifically concurring). In this regard, Montana's argument that the Legislature can regulate campus activity is misleading at best. It cites, for example, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 20-25-511 (student privacy), 20-25-513 (student room entry), 20-25-515 (student records) and 20-25-603 (teacher

instruction) for the proposition that despite "Article X, § 9's clear language," these laws govern and control MUS. These laws as well as those set forth in Mont. Code Ann. §§ 20-25-301 (BOR's powers and duties), 20-25-302 (BOR's powers regarding revenue producing facilities) and 20-25-324 (firearms), were originally enacted under the 1889 Montana constitution when BOR was subject "legislative devise." In 2021, however, when the Legislature enacted HB 102, art. X, § 9 Montanans had long freed BOR from the state's "bureaucratic [politics]" and "political changes of fortune" so it could comply with its constitutional rights, duties and obligations owed to the public. *Sheehy*, 36, fn. 2 (J. McKinnon, specifically concurring).

A review of the 1972 constitutional convention debate over Mont. Const. art. X, § 9, is helpful in determining the intent of the framers regarding the bounds of the Board's authority. The 1972 constitutional convention debate on Article X, Section 9, reveals the delegates' intention to place the Montana University System (MUS) beyond the political influence of the legislature, entrusting it instead to a Board which should be directly responsible and answerable to the people.

Sheehy, ¶ 36 (J. McKinnon, specifically concurring). Thus, Montana is, respectfully, incorrect when it boldly argues "[t]he bottom line is that the Legislature is the Legislature, even on MUS campuses." While that position may be true in Texas, Colorado, Utah and Georgia, the 1972 constitution delegation had the intent, foresight, and wisdom to ensure that in Montana, the BOR would be "free from excessive legislative control" and political bureaucracy when it drafted Mont. Const., Art. X, § 9(2)(a)'s text. Sheehy, ¶ 35 (J. McKinnon, specifically concurring). In this regard, Mont. Const., art. X, § 9 represents a //////

10 11

12

13 14

1516

17

18

19

2021

22

2324

25

necessary and proper power balance between Montana's Executive and Legislative branches in order to reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from the Legislature.

## BOR argues, in relevant part, that:

The plain language of Article X, § 9 grants to the Board "full" authority to institute firearms policy on its campuses. The Board is vested with the "government and control of the Montana university system" and is "responsible for long-range planning, and for coordinating and evaluating policies and programs for the state's educational systems." Mont. Const. Art. X, § 9. The Board has the "full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system . . . ." Mont. Const. Art. X, § 9; Sheehy, ¶ 11. "Full control" means just that; the Board is vested with "full" authority to supervise, coordinate, manage, and control MUS and its campuses, which necessarily includes the creation and implementation of firearm policy.

While the language of the Constitution – and the grant of "full authority" to the Board – is perfectly clear, this Court also must review Article X, § 9 "in light of the historical and surrounding circumstances under which the Framers drafted Constitution, the nature of the subject matter they faced, and the objective they sought to achieve." Id. "The exact legal status with which to clothe higher education in Montana was debated extensively and thoroughly in the sessions of the . . . [1972] Convention." Schaefer, Hugh. The Legal Status of the Montana University System Under the New Montana Constitution, 35 Mont. L. Rev. 189, 190 (1974). Without question, the debates at the constitutional convention establish the Framers' intention to place the MUS beyond the political influence of the legislature by creating a Board directly responsible and answerable to the people. Sheehy, ¶ 36 (concurrence). At the Constitutional Convention, the Education Committee reported to the delegates:

Higher education is not simply another state service; the administrative structure of higher education cannot be considered an ordinary state agency. The unique character of the college and university stands apart from the business-as-usual of the state. Higher learning and research is a sensitive area which requires a particular kind of protection not matched in other administrative functions of the state.

### 2 Montana Constitutional Convention at 736.

The 1972 Constitution created the Board as an autonomous, independent body, "effectively insulat[ing] the public campuses from Montana political officials in lieu of giving those political officials more direct control over public campuses." Aronofsky, David. Voters Wisely Reject Proposed Const. Amendment 30 to Eliminate the Montana Board of Regents, 58 Mont. L. Rev. 333, 333 (1997) ("Aronofsky"). "[T]he principle of regent independence was definitely intended by the drafters of the 1972 Montana Constitution." Judge, 543 P.2d at 1332. The delegates "rejected various proposed floor amendments aimed at weakening the Montana Board's autonomous powers, including amendments which would have restored legislative control over university system finances and administrative decision-making." Aronofsky at 365 (citing IX Montana Constitutional Convention Transcripts at 6532).

(BOR Brief, pp. 5-7.) Like Montana, however, BOR relies upon "statutory authority" of its powers and duties that were enacted under the Mont. Const. (1889), art. XI, § 11. For example, BOR contends that:

Indeed, the Legislature has long recognized that the Board is the appropriate body to determine firearms policy on campuses. Decades ago, the Legislature enacted § 20-25-324, MCA, which provides:

Firearms. Security guards who have successfully completed the basic course in law enforcement conducted

by the Montana law enforcement academy may carry firearms in accordance with policies established by the board of regents after consulting with the student body government at the unit of the university system affected by the regents' policy.

(Emphasis added). In this statute, the Legislature acknowledged not only the Board's primary authority to regulate firearms on campus, but also acknowledged that the processes used by the Board – which include student input – are necessary in the unique setting of higher education.

(BOR Brief, p. 8.)

BOR also ignores that Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 was originally enacted under the 1889 Montana constitution when BOR was subject "legislative devise." "Security guards shall be authorized to carry firearms between sunset and sunrise and at any time when acting as guards for transportation of money or other valuables." Rev. Code Mont.1947, 75-8516 (1947); codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 (1971). In 1981, the Legislature amended section 20-25-324 to:

Security guards who have successfully completed the basic course in law enforcement conducted by the Montana law enforcement academy may carry firearms in accordance with policies established by the [BOR]:

- (1) between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m.; and
- (2) whenever guarding money or other valuables.

Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324 (1981). Then, in 1991, the Legislature again amended section 20-25-324. It appears that the BOR did not oppose the 1981 or 1991 amendments. In fact, BOR Policy No. 1006 closely mirrors the 1991 version (and present) of Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324. Moreover, the 2021

8

7

10

9

11 12

13 14

1516

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

/////

Legislature did not amend, repeal or alter, in any way, Mont. Code Ann. § 20-25-324. Thus, as to whom may carry a firearm on MUS property, it seems that in 1981 and 1991 Montana and BOR either agreed on the issue or ignored BOR's "government and control" and "full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system . . . ." Mont. Const., art. X, § 9; *Sheehy*, ¶ 11.

Notwithstanding, however, BOR is unable to waive structural constitutional provisions because they define the shape of government for the benefit of all.

Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the branches of the Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), for instance, the Court held that Congress had infringed the President's appointment power, despite the fact that the President himself had manifested his consent to the statute that caused the infringement by signing it into law. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842, n.12. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-959, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), we held that the legislative veto violated the constitutional requirement that legislation be presented to the President, despite Presidents' approval of hundreds of statutes containing a legislative veto provision. See id., at 944-945. The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the "consent" of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States."

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-82 (1992); see also, In Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (the Court overturned a provision that violated separation of powers even though the Executive and Legislature overwhelming agreed on its passage, implicitly ruling that branches cannot waive their constitutional boundaries.) Moreover, as BOR correctly points out, "[t]he Legislature may not abrogate a constitutional grant of authority because a constitutional directive 'cannot be frustrated' by statute. City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Company, 2018 MT 139, ¶ 29, 391 Mont. 422, 419 P.3d 685."

As to whom may carry firearms, whether open or concealed carry, on MUS property, this Court finds that Mont. Const., art. X, § 9's plain language grants this authority to BOR, not the Legislature. In enacting HB 102, the Legislature, without a reasonable doubt, interfered with BOR's "government and control of the Montana university system" and its "full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system." Mont. Const., art. X, § 9(2). Accordingly, this Court concludes that the BOR has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Article X, § 9's plain language grants it "full authority" to institute firearms policy on its campuses. While this Court is mindful that Montana has a legitimate interest in protecting the public, it is equally mindful that Mont. Const., art. X., §9(2) provides the BOR with a constitutional shield from majority tyranny relative to the governance and control of MUS property.

/////

/////

/////

# **BOR's Constitutional Authority to Regulate Firearms on MUS Property Appears not to Infringe on Other Constitutional Rights**

The *Judge* Court held that Mont. Const., art. X, § 9 "must not be read or construed in isolation" to other constitutional provisions. *Judge*, 168 Mont. at 443. Here, this Court believes that the Legislature's power under Mont. Const., art. V, § 1 as well as U.S. Const. amend. II and Mont. Const., art. II, § 12 must be harmonized with Mont. Const., art. X, § 9(2) relative to whether the Legislature or the Executive branch, via the BOR, has the exclusive constitutional authority to regulate firearms on MUS campuses and other locations.

#### Montana claims that

HB 102—which regulates firearm possession for self-defense on public property—is a quintessential exercise of the State's police power to make laws for the public welfare, health, and safety. The Legislature wields that power, not the Board.

It also reminds this Court of Justice McKinnon's concurring statement that BOR "cannot abridge rights protected by the federal or state constitutions, and is subject to state legislation enforcing state-wide standards for public welfare, health, and safety."). *Sheehy*, ¶ 41. The Court respectfully reminds Montana that art. X, § 9(2) is a prohibition upon legislative power. *Judge*, 168 Mont. at 444 (citing authority). As such, this Court agrees with the BOR that under Mont. Const., art. X, § 9(2), the BOR is responsible for public welfare, health and safety on MUS property.

Montana also claims that the Legislature's ability to create public policy overrides the BOR's authority with respect to firearm policy<sup>8</sup>. It claims it has the "power to protect constitutional rights – here, the right to keep or bear

<sup>8</sup> As indicated earlier, whether BOR Policy 1006 is constitutional is not at issue in this proceeding.
Summary Judgment Order – page 24
BDV-2021-598

arms...." Here, the federal and state constitutions each provide constitutional guarantees regarding the right to bear arms. Montana contends that the BOR may not infringe on these constitutional rights under Mont. Const., art. X, § 9(2). As this Court has previously held, and no party disputes, the constitutional right to keep or bear arms' scope is limited.

The Second Amendment provides:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

U.S. Const. amend. II.

Amendment protects an individual's right to possess a firearm "unconnected with militia service." *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 5825 (2008). At its "core," the Second Amendment is the right of "law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." *Heller*, at 634-35. Notwithstanding, however, the individual rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment, are "not unlimited." *Heller*, at 626. In this regard, the *Heller* Court identified a non-exhaustive list of "presumptively lawful regulatory measures" that have historically been treated as exceptions to the right to bear arms. *Heller*, at 626-27 & n.26. They include, but are not limited to, "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, [] laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, [and] laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." *Heller*, at 626-27 (emphasis added).

Moreover, in *Robertson v. Baldwin*, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), the United States Supreme Court made clear that the Second Amendment did not

protect the right to carry a concealed weapon. The Robertson Court stated:

[T]he first 10 amendments to the constitution, commonly known as the "Bill of Rights," were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial, been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions, arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental law, there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus . . . the right of the people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons[.]

Id., at 281-82.

#### In Montana:

The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, <u>but</u> nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of <u>concealed weapons</u>.

Mont. Const., art. II, sec. 12, Mont. Const. (emphasis added). This right is also limited. *State v. Fadness*, 2012 MT 12, ¶ 31, 363 Mont. 322, 268 P.3d 17 (citing *State v. Maine*, 2011 MT 90, ¶ 29, 360 Mont. 182, 255 P.3d 64). The *Fadness* Court noted that:

In fact, in proposing Article II, Section 12 at the 1972 Constitutional Convention, the Bill of Rights Committee noted "that the statutory efforts to regulate the possession of firearms have been at the federal level and are, therefore, not subject to state Constitutional provisions. In addition, it is urged—and requires no citation—that the right to bear arms is subject to the police power of the state." Montana Constitutional Convention, Comments on the Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, Feb. 22, 1972, vol. II, p. 634; see also Montana

Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Mar. 8, 1972, pp. 1725-42, Mar. 9, 1972, pp. 1832-42 (twice rejecting a proposal to add nor shall any person's firearms be registered or licensed" to Article II, Section 12, with several opponents of this language arguing that the decision to adopt registration and licensing requirements is a legislative, rather than constitutional, matter).

Id.

As this Court understands, neither the United States Supreme Court<sup>9</sup> nor the Montana Supreme Court have held that a member of the general public has an absolute, constitutional right to openly carry a firearm in public for individual self-defense. While that question is not before this Court, in 2021, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, among other things, that:

After careful review of the history of early English and American regulation of carrying arms openly in the public square, the en banc court concluded that Hawai'i's restrictions on the open carrying of firearms reflect longstanding prohibitions, and therefore, the conduct they regulate is outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment. The en banc court held that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an unfettered, general right to openly carry arms in public for individual self-defense.

Young v. Hawaii et al., 992 F.3d 765, 773 [quotation at decision summary] (2021). As to concealed carry, there can be no dispute that federal and Montana law is clear that there is no constitutional right for a member of the general public to carry a concealed firearm in public.

Here, under art. X, § 9(2), this Court has determined that the BOR, not the Legislature, has the power to determine whom may carry firearms on MUS property. Furthermore, there is no controlling legal authority that a member of the general public has the right to carry, openly or concealed, a firearm under either the United States Constitution or the Montana Constitution. Thus, it appears, in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> As of the date of this order, the United States Supreme Court had yet to issue its decision in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc.*, et al. v. Bruen et al., No. 20-843. In that case, oral argument was held on November 3, 2021.

Summary Judgment Order – page 27

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

harmonizing art. X, § 9(2) with the identified constitutional provisions, the policy that Montana argues it is entitled to police and protect, as it relates to HB 102, simply does not exist under the current law. As such, to the extent HB 102 impermissibly infringes and interferes with BOR's constitutional authority it is unconstitutional.

#### CONCLUSION

The BOR is entitled to summary judgment. It has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that HB 102 sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, as applied to BOR, are unconstitutional in that they violate Mont. Const., art. X, § 9(2). As such, to the extent these identified sections impermissibly infringe and interfere with BOR's constitutional authority, they are unconstitutional. Moreover, the application and enforcement of these sections on or at MUS campuses and locations, or against the Board, must, and shall be, permanently enjoined.

## **ORDER**

Based on the above, this Court hereby **ORDERS**, **DECLARES**, **ADJUDGES AND DECREES** as follows:

- 1. HB 102's sections 3<sup>10</sup>, 4<sup>11</sup>, 5<sup>12</sup>, 6<sup>13</sup>, 7<sup>14</sup> and 8<sup>15</sup>, as applied to BOR, are unconstitutional in that they violate BOR's authority under Mont. Const., art. X, § 9(2).
- 2. This Court's May 28, 2021 Temporary Restraining Order is **CONVERTED** to a Permanent Injunction; and

/////

2324

25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-355 (2021)

<sup>11</sup> Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-356 (2021)

<sup>12</sup> Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-359 (2021)

<sup>13</sup> Mont. Code Ann. §45-8-358 (2021)

<sup>14</sup> Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-359 (2021)

<sup>15</sup> Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-111 (2021)